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FOREWORD: ANTITRUST AS PUBLIC INTEREST LAW*
RUDOLPH J.R. PERrIZ**

I. INTRODUCTION

The year 1990 marks the one-hundredth anniversary of the Sherman
Act,' American antitrust law's "charter of economic liberty."2 Inspired
by the anti-monopoly and anti-cartel sentiments of the Progressive Era, the
Act has withstood cycles of uneven enforcement by successive presidential
administrations, shifting interpretation by the federal courts, and wavering
public support. This record, in significant part, has been the result of
recurrent controversy over the public interests to be served.
Although these public interests have always been associated with
competition policy, this consensus has settled very little about antitrust law
because competition policy has meant too many things to too many
interpreters.3 In seeking to understand the kinds of public interests
implicated in competition policy, judges, practitioners, government policy
makers, and scholars have often looked outside legal discourse to the
disciplines of history and economics. Over the last century, each discipline
has offered various formulations of the public interests to be associated
with antitrust law and competition policy.
New York Law School invited a group of scholars, government
officials, and practitioners to address the question of public interest as it

* This foreword was developed out of introductory remarks presented at a conference
entitled Observing the Sherman Act Centennial: The Past and Future of Antitrust As Public
Interest Law, sponsored by the faculty and Law Review of New York Law School (Nov.
16, 1990).
** Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. Ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
2. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
3. I have taken the position that competition policy has never provided the sole
normative ground for antitrust. I have written elsewhere that antitrust has been produced
by a tension between competition policy and private property rights, two rhetorics whose
historical forms can be understood in terms of internal conflicts between commitments to
the values of liberty and equality. See R. PERrZ, REFORMING ANTITRUST LAW:
COMPETION POLICY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CONFLICT (forthcoming from Oxford
University Press); Peritz, A Counter-HistoryofAntitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 285-300
[hereinafter Peritz, Counter-History]; Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law:
PropertyLogic in Restraintof Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.L. 285, 287 (1989) [hereinafter
Peritz, "Rule of Reason"];Peritz, The PredicamentofAntitrust Jurisprudence:Economics
and the Monopolization of Price DiscriminationArgument, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1205, 1212
[hereinafter Peritz, Antitrust Jurisprudence].
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relates to antitrust law, at a conference held at the law school on
November 16, 1990. 4 This symposium issue marking the Sherman Act
centennial developed out of that conference.
This foreword proceeds in four parts: part II offers three observations
about the historical relationship between competition policy and public
interests associated with antitrust. Part III reviews the four articles in this
issue that examine antitrust history. Part IV comments on the four pieces
that address antitrust economics. Part V considers the four essays that treat
government activity to serve the public interest. A brief concluding section
discusses three important issues raised in both the conference proceedings
and the symposium articles.
II. THREE OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE HISTORICAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION POLICY
AND PUBLIC INTEREST IN ANTITRUST
Though statutory in origin, antitrust history has been characterized in
common-law terms, terms nicely reflected in the early writing of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.: "When ancient rules maintain themselves... new
reasons more fitted to the time have been found for them, and.., they
gradually receive a new content, and at last a new form, from the grounds
to which they have been transplanted."5 If antitrust is imagined as a series
of "ancient rules" in varying stages of (re)formation, then the following
observations can be understood as directing attention to three "grounds"
supporting the body of rules and the possibility of change in antitrust.
The first observation relates to a recent change in the way we talk
about competition policy-the shift to an exclusionary discourse of
4. The conference consisted of three panel discussions. The first panel was entitled
"Using Historical Analysis to Formulate the Public Interest." The members of this panel
included Professors Daniel R. Ernst, Georgetown University Law Center; William P.
LaPiana, New York Law School; James P. May, Washington College of Law, American
University; and Martin Sklar, Department of History, Bucknell University. Professor
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., New York Law School, served as moderator.
The second panel discussion was entitled "Using Economic Analysis to Formulate the
Public Interest." The participants included Professors Eleanor M. Fox, New York
University School of Law; Robert H. Lande, University of Baltimore School of Law; and
William G. Shepherd, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts. This
discussion was moderated by Professor John J. Flynn, University of Utah College of Law.
I served as the moderator of the third and final panel discussion of the conference,
entitled "Government Action to Represent the Public Interest." The speakers on this third
panel were Messrs. Taylor Briggs of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae; Lloyd Constantine,
Chief of the Antitrust Bureau, New York State Department of Law; William J. Curran IIM,
Editor-in-Chief, Antitrust Bulletin; and Ms. Judy Whalley, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice.
5. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).
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neoclassical economics. The second unpacks the familiar notion of "free
competition--a dilemma at work in antitrust policy since the Sherman
Act's passage. The third observation finds "ancient rules" firmly imbedded
in unacknowledged antitrust policy grounds-the venerable institution of
private property rights.
A. Public Interest and the Bulbous Flora of Turkey
In considering the kinds of public interests associated with modem
antitrust and reconsidering the lack of public opposition to the Reagan
decade of antitrust neglect,6 I was reminded of the technical economics
discourse that monopolizes current antitrust policy analysis: we speak of
the Herfindahl index and "small but significant and nontransitory"
increases in price, of "deadweight welfare loss" and "contestability" theory.
To citizens, lawyers, judges, policy makers, and scholars who do not work
with the "new economic learning," 7 antitrust policy analysis must seem as
foreign as a dissertation on the bulbous flora of Turkey
6. See generally Potts, 'Toothless' FTC Gets Its Bite Back: Steiger Invigorates

Enforcement Role, Wash. Post, June 9, 1991, at Hl, col. 1 (stating that Reagan
administration ignored non-merger antitrust violations); Lewis, The Reagan Revolution in
Antitrust,N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (arguing that Reagan administration's neglect
of antitrust law spurred the "merger-mania" of the 1980s).
7. For a discussion of the New Learning doctrine, see Adams & Brock, The Antitrust
Vision and Its Revisionist Critics, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rnv. 939, 941-46 (1990), and sources

cited therein.
8. My source for the reference to bulbous flora of Turkey is a personal experience. Late
one afternoon in January of 1990, I was aboard a commercial airliner, on my way to a
conference in North Carolina. As we taxied up to the queue of planes waiting to depart
LaGuardia Airport, the passenger beside me asked if I was headed for Durham. "Yes," I
answered, "to a conference."
"Really! I'm also going to a conference-the Southeast Regional Meeting of the
American Rock Gardening Club. Are you a rock gardener?"
"Rock gardener?" I asked. "No. I'm going to another meeting. What happens at your
conferences? Do you look at slides?" (A rather witless question, I realized, as the words
were leaving my mouth.)
"Sometimes we do," she said. "Rock gardens are popular in and around New York
City. Slide shows are quite common there. But we do lots of other things at regional
meetings, too. If the weather is nice, we take rock garden tours. There are always speeches.
Sometimes there are panel discussions. In recent years, the speeches have tended to be
technical-like efficient seed germination procedures for Long Island North Shore gardeners.
Stuff like that."
When I asked whether there was something in particular that had attracted her to the
conference in Durham, she responded: "Yes. The chief horticulturist of Tivoli Gardens in
Copenhagen will be the featured speaker. His talk is entitled The Bulbous Floraof Turkey.
I wonder whether he is serious about the topic or whether he intends to parody the technical
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Just recall for a moment the traditional language of antitrust policy
analysis. In 1933, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for the Court:
"As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions." 9 In 1958, Justice Hugo Black characterized the Sherman Act
as a "comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade."" ° In his oft-cited opinion
for the Court in the 1962 Brown Shoe merger case," Chief Justice Earl
Warren declared: "We cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned
businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices
might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.
It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.""
Compare, for example, the current Justice Department Merger
Guidelines," which embody the public interest served in evaluating
mergers such as those between Texaco and Getty, or Chevron and
Gulf-four multi-billion dollar oil companies. The following language led
antitrust enforcement agencies to find that these 1983 mergers threatened
no "substantial lessening of competition:
A market is defined as a product or group of products and a
geographic area in which it is sold such that a hypothetical, profittalks that have become so common these days." In response to my question about the point
of such a parody, she continued: "Tivoli is, after all, a public park, and there are important
questions to be answered about park design, public access, fund expenditures-especially
questions about who should represent the public's interest when those decisions are made.
Is he going to parody the way these questions have come to be treated as technical
questions? Or is he really going to talk about the bulbous flora of Turkey?"
My fellow traveler then asked about the conference I planned to attend. I replied that
I had been invited to give a talk on antitrust law. "Oh," she wondered. "Antitrust law?"
In retrospect, I should not have been surprised that her reaction to antitrust paralleled
mine to rock gardening-after all, the distinguished historian Richard Hofstadter chronicled
antitrust's disappearance from public concern more than twenty-five years ago. See R.
HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHMR ESSAYS 188, 189 (1965) (stating that historians and the
public ignore antitrust because it has become "complex, difficult, and boring"). Still, I had
assumed that Hofstadter spoke too soon. There was, after all, an antitrust revival that began
after the original 1959 publication of his essay.
9. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
10. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
11. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
12. Id at 344 (discussing the 1950 Celler-Kevauver amendments to the Clayton Act).
13. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Revised Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg.
26,823 (1984).

1990]

FOREWORD

maximizing firm that was the only present and future seller of
those products in that area would impose a "small but significant
increase in price above prevailing or likely
and nontransitory"
14
future levels.
There has been a shift in policy analysis-a shift from political

economy to economics, from judgments about values to assessments of
abstract technicalities, from concern over economic power in its multiple
forms to concern over market power of a particular form.
Although it is not self-evident that economics must produce antitrust
policy defined in technical jargon, -duringthe Reagan decade of the 1980s
the Justice Department's and Federal Trade Commission's embrace of a

price-theory model for antitrust analysis coincided with a broader rhetorical
shift in antitrust since the late 1970s, a shift from political or normative
discourse to technical talk.15 Perhaps with some irony, antitrust policy has
concurrently become much simpler. Sometimes shrouded in the obscure
language of neoclassical economics and othertimes advertised under the
trademarks of efficiency or (anti-Naderite) "consumer welfare," 6 the goal
of price-theory proponents has been to reinstate laissez-faire, to get
government out of the business of regulating commercial markets. 7 The
traditional array of goals associated with competition has been shoved into
the archives of antitrust history-goals such as the abatement of unfair
14. Ia § 2.
15. See Peritz, Counter-History,supranote 3, at 300-11. My references to the Reagan
administration are meant to include not only administrative but also judicial appointments.
The clearest example of a judicial appointment consistent. with the economic ideology of
laissez-faire is Justice Antonin Scalia. For an illustration of how this ideology can lead to
new antitrust doctrine, see Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717
(1988). For a criticism, see Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 511, 550-54 (1989) [hereinafter Peritz, Genealogy].
16. Since the phrase "consumer welfare"
shares semantic elements with the Ralph Nader consumerism movement, there
has been a feeling that Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and other price theorists
share the Naderites' concerns for consumers. Nothing could be farther from the
truth, we have learned. Where Naderites call for commercial firms to take social
responsibility for their products, services, and effects on society, price theorists
believe that firms only have a responsibility to shareholders to maximize
earnings.
Peritz, Counter-History,supra note 3, at 311.
17. Two recent books assess the effects of this laissez-faire policy in recent years. See
R. KUTYNER, THE END OF LAIssEZ-FAIRE: NATIONAL PURPOSE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
AFrER THE COLD WAR (1991) (offering an historical framework for U.S. international
economic and political policy since the Bretton Woods accords following World War II);
K. PHILLIPS, THE PoLrmcs OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE
INTHE REAGAN AFTERMATH (1990) (focusing on domestic policy).
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competition, a strong preference for individual entrepreneurs, the disfavor
of monopoly profits, a distrust of firms with great economic power, and a
recognition of competition as a process with social, economic, and political
returns.
But what sense does it make to talk about "public interest" when the
language of policy analysis is not public?"8 Is the "public interest" best
served by "experts" whose discourse is inaccessible? Should we presume
that price theorists simply manipulate neutral principles? We, of course,
learned long ago that normative choices and expert judgments cannot be
separated so neatly. Nor is the relationship between theory and policy
clear: it is arguable that price theory -both clung to the coattails of the
"Reagan revolution" and provided intellectual capital for a laissez-faire
ideology already at the heart of the Reagan era's brand of "consumer
welfare."
B. Public Interest and "Free Competition"
Certainly, laissez-faire is not a newcomer to the antitrust policy
agenda. The Bush administration's re-invigorated Antitrust Division
reminds us, moreover, that antitrust enforcement seems to run in cycles.
The periodic (dis)appearance of laissez-faire can be understood in terms of
an old dilemma reflected in the familiar notion of "free competition."
As I have written elsewhere, calls for free competition raise a question
about the nature of competition's restraint.2" From which tyranny do we
want to free competition? From governmental power? Or private market
power? If we want to eliminate governmental interference with markets,
then, for example, FTC intervention to enjoin unfair competition is bad. If,
however, we want to diminish private market power, then FTC intervention
can be good when it succeeds. More realistically, how do we formulate
doctrine that reflects distrust of both kinds of power?
The dilemma of free competition embodies some sort of tension
lodged in competition policy. My historical research provides the basis for
representing the tension in terms of a conflict between commitments to
18. See generally J. HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY: STUDENT PROTEsT,
SCIENCE, AND POLITICS 62-80 (1970) (arguing that there must be a translation of scientific
terms employed in policy analysis in order for the public to develop meaningful opinions).
For a more in-depth treatment of this subject by Habermas, see J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND
PRACTICE 1-41, 253-82 (1973).

19. See generally Johnston, InJusticeDept. of the 90's,Focus Shiftsfrom Rights, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 26, 1991, at Al, col. 1 (discussing changes at Antitrust Division, including
increased enforcement activity, since Bush took office).
20. See Peritz, Counter-History,supra note 3, at 264; Peritz, "Rule of Reason", supra
note 3, at 296, 337.
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liberty and equality.21 A primary commitment to liberty supports
competition free of government intervention-laissez-faire. As Chief Justice
Edward White wrote for the Court in the formative era, the plain intent of
the Sherman Act was to protect the "freedom to contract," which he
viewed as "the essence of freedom from undue restraint" of trade.' A
primary commitment to equality, however, underwrites competition free of
private market power-the ideal of perfect competition and the pragmatics
of workable competition. Justice Rufus Peckham's earlier majority opinion
stated that "[t]he public is not entitled to free and unrestricted competition,
but to fair and healthy competition" because trusts and cartels were driving
"out of business the small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been
spent therein.... Mere reduction in the price of the commodity dealt in
might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a class ... of small but
independent dealers."'
Currently, references to free competition are taken to reflect primary
commitments to liberty. Nonetheless, concern about dominant firms-about
excessive economic power-remains. Our distrust of all discretionary power
remains, as does the challenge of fashioning doctrine to reflect our twin
concerns.
C. Public Interest and Private Property Rights
Since the Sherman Act debates, private property rights have played a
leading role in the formulation of antitrust doctrine. In short, competition
policy has never provided the sole normative basis for antitrust.24 That
may seem obvious, given our view that competition policy presupposes
private property rights-without them, competitive markets as we know
them are not possible. But there is another side to the complex relationship
between competition policy and private property rights: they are not only
complementary but also in conflict. Each defines the limit of the other.
Horizontal merger doctrine provides a good example of this tension.
On one side, competition policy calls for the arrest of mergers that result
in dominant firms. On the other, preventing owners from selling their
business interferes with their fundamental right to sell their property. The
well-known case of Northern Securities Co.v. United States,25 with its
splintered majority, concurring, and twin dissenting opinions, dramatizes
one early battle in an unrelenting conflict between two logics, two sets of
21. See Peritz, Counter-History,supra note 3, at 264.
22. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
23. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
24. See Peritz, Counter-History,supranote 3, at 264; Peritz, "Rule ofReason", supra
note 3, at 296, 337; Peritz, Antitrust Jurisprudence,supra note 3, at 1212.
25. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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assumptions and beliefs about antitrust.' Almost a century later, antitrust
doctrine still displays conflicting commitments to competition policy and
private property rights." Our understanding of modem antitrust, including
the current attraction to price theory's rhetorics of "efficiency" and
"consumer welfare," would profit from recognizing the social force of
private property rights.
D. PublicInterest in Antitrust Today
Each of these three observations about the historical relationship
between competition policy and antitrust has something to say about the
genealogy of "public interest" as we understand it today. First, price
theory's rhetorics of "efficiency" and "consumer welfare" are not proxies
for competition policy, which has traditionally embodied a bundle of social
values. Plucking efficiency out of the bundle reflects a political judgment
that requires open debate, justification, and legitimate political action.
Second, the Reagan administration's neglect of antitrust enforcement,28
founded in a laissez-faire ideology, represents only one side of the
dilemma of "free competition." The other side, founded in concern over
excessive market power, calls for antitrust enforcement to maintain or
reinstate the market conditions necessary for workable competition. Several
articles in this symposium offer elegant analyses of these two points.29
Third, the mainstream view of antitrust does not hold; despite its openendedness, competition policy has never provided the sole normative
ground for antitrust doctrine. Instead, it has been a Hundred Years' War
between competition policy and private property rights that has produced
antitrust law-not only Rufus Peckham's concern for the plight of "small
dealers and worthy men,"" but also Robert Bork's laissez-faire surrogate
of "consumer welfare."31 Understanding antitrust doctrine and its relation
26. For a discussion of this case, see Peritz, "Rule of Reason ",supranote 3, at 321-26.
27. See Peritz, Genealogy, supranote 15 (describing tensions between private property
rights and competition policy within the context of vertical restraints doctrines).
28. See Potts, supra note 6.

29. See Adams & Brock, supra note 7; Levy, Analyzing Anticompetitive Behavior in
RetailMarkets: Things Are Not Always as Simple As They May Appear, 35 N.Y.L. SCH.L.
REV.969 (1990); Shepherd, Economic Analysis to Guide Antitrust Enforcement: Prospects

for Section 2, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 917 (1990).
My views are developed more fully in works cited supra note 3. In my view, the
dilemma of free competition reflects the working of a tension within the rhetoric of
competition, a tension between commitments to liberty and equality. My work also shows

how the same tension has produced different kinds of private property rights rhetorics in
antitrust
30. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
31. See, e.g., R.BoRK, TE ANTUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 51
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to historical forms of "public interest" requires attention to "public" values
associated with competition policy and economic egalitarianism as well as
acknowledgment of "private" values associated with private property rights
and economic liberty.
It appears that the wheel of antitrust history continues to turn. After a
decade of dominating the market for antitrust policy, price theory is in
decline. This decline is displayed in four events. First, on the demand side,
the Bush administration's Justice Department Antitrust Division and
Federal Trade Commission have not followed their predecessors' dogmatic
pursuit of price theory's goal of laissez-faire, insofar as they have already
adopted more aggressive enforcement policies than their Reagan
forerunners. 2 Next, state attorneys general never fully bought into price
theory, having enforced the antitrust laws more and more vigorously in the
1980s.
On the supply side, moreover, there is dynamic competition from two
sources. First,many mainstream economists are producing sharp criticisms
and alternative visions. Second, a group of legal historians is putting
antitrust into historical contexts that call into question price theory's claims
about efficiency as antitrust's unrivaled social policy. 3
This symposium is in large part a collection of work by such scholars,
as well as others who share a deep skepticism about the legitimacy or the
efficacy of current antitrust policy analysis-whether price-theory economics
or reductionist historiography-which seeks to avoid or forget antitrust's
socio-political proportions. This collection of articles observes the Sherman
Act centennial by exploring the historical richness and economic legacy of
antitrust as public interest law.
1IH. USING HISTORICAL ANALYSIS TO
FORMULATE THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The first group of articles divides nicely into two categories. On the
one hand, the contributions by Martin Sklar and William LaPiana present
(1978) (stating that the "only legitimate goal" of antitrust law is "consumer welfare"); Bork,
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 675, 739-48 (1966)
(advocating consumer welfare principles).
32. See Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed FederaVState
Balance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1047, 1066 (1990).
33. See, e.g., -Flynn, The Reagan Administration's Antitrust Policy, "Original Intent"
and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259 (1988); Fox, The
Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1140 (1981);
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985); May, Antitrust
Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach
of Stute Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495 (1987); Millon, The Sherman
Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S.CAL. L. REV. 1219 (1988).
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two distinctive historical studies of public interest formulation during
antitrust's early years.' On the other, those by James May and Daniel
Ernst represent meta-historical analyses of the ways various antitrust
historians have approached the task of recovering the public interests
associated with antitrust policy over the last century. s
As part of Professor Sklar's larger study of the progressive era's
corporate reconstruction of American capitalism,' his article, Sherman
Antitrust Act Jurisprudenceand FederalPolicy-Making in the Formative
Period, 1890-1914, describes and analyzes the "adaptation of the legal
order to corporate capitalism."37 The research suggests that the Supreme
Court's "rule of reason," announced in the well-known Standard Oil
opinion," reflected the legal domain's accommodation to an economic
shift from competition among small producers to one of "corporate
administration of the market."39 Sklar observes that this accommodation
"was an outcome of political contention stretching over twenty-five years
(and beyond) . ...
It was, finally, an outcome of the great social
movement for corporate capitalism that rejected a statist for a liberal
form."'
An interesting bit of irony in this characterization is the
portrayal of Justice Rufus Peckham as statist, notwithstanding his repeated
commitments to individual liberty written into both his antitrust and
constitutional law opinions, perhaps
best remembered in his praise of
"small dealers and worthy men."4 Indeed, Peckham appears statist
precisely at the moment he called for government imposition of
competition to trump private agreements between corporate competitors.
While Peckham understood this commitment in terms of protecting
industrial liberty, Sklar points out that it legitimized political power over
economic matters-public policy over individual interests.42
34. See LaPiana, The Legal Culture of the FormativePeriodin Sherman AntitrustAct
Jurisprudence, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 827 (1990); Sklar, Sherman Antitrust Act
Jurisprudenceand FederalPolicy-Making in the Formative Period,1890-1914, 35 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REV. 791 (1990).
35. See Ernst, The New Antitrust History, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 879 (1990); May,
HistoricalAnalysis in Antitrust Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 857 (1990).
36. For a more comprehensive study of this subject by Sklar, see M. SKLAR, THE
CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE
LAw, AND POLTCs (1988) (co-recipient of Willard J. Hurst prize for legal history in 1989).

37. Sklar, supra note 34, at 826.
38. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
39. Sklar, supra note 34, at 820.

40. Id at 826.
41. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
42. See Sklar, supra note 34, at 821.
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As a complement to Sklar's sociocultural and political-economic
approach to legal history, Professor LaPiana paints an intellectual history
of the formative era by drawing on the views of the nature of law held by
lawyers arguing major antitrust cases and Justices writing major antitrust
opinions in that era. LaPiana's The Legal Culture of the FormativePeriod
in Sherman Act Jurisprudence illustrates the value of this approach by
illuminating "the relationship between antitrust jurisprudence and visions
of the public good."43 For example, Justice Peckham's interpretation of
the Sherman Act, which proscribed all contracts in restraint of trade-all
agreements between independent entrepreneurs to manage
competition-makes better sense when considered in light of his belief, as
explained by LaPiana, that well-functioning markets require first and
foremost "virtuous individual[s],"' and his view that "saw America as
fulfilling a millennial dream, as a sort of Protestant utopia, challenged by
baleful economic change."45 In sharp contrast, Justice Edward White,
whose notoriously opaque "rule of reason" opinion framed a category
of reasonable trusts, was "concerned with the application of 'general
principles of law' and 'elementary principles of justice."' 47 White was
intent upon "defend[ing] the common law"' which preceded the Sherman
Act, a common law which "embodied the essence of Anglo-American
liberty." 49 It is not at all surprising, then, that White resolutely wrote
"rule of reason" dissents from 1897 through 1911, defending "the liberty
of contract" against Peckham's assaults. In 1911, the majority of the Court
finally adopted White's view in the Standard Oil opinion." What is
surprising in this context, however, is Peckham's abandonment of his
literalist (or statist) jurisprudence to join the StandardOil majority's "rule
of reason" opinion. '
In his HistoricalAnalysis in Antitrust Law, James May raises a series
of questions about "the uses of history... in perceptions of the public
interest in antitrust law." 52 He asks: "To what extent might we usefully
see [the disfavor of nonefficiency-focused views of the public interest after
the 1960s] as an indication of the weakness of later twentieth-century
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

LaPiana, supra note 34, at 827.
Id at 832.
Id at 850.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
LaPiana, supra note 34, at 832.
Id at 839.
Id at 835.
Standard 011, 221 U.S. at 1.
Id
May, supra note 35, at 857.
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theory in general, unable to provide more compelling theoretical means to
incorporate systematically a broader range of values and concerns?"53
After giving an insightful survey of the changing pattern of antitrust-history
scholarship, May turns to the work of constitutional historians for
instruction and perhaps for the compelling theoretical means he finds
lacking.
At the very least, better history, May writes, can "help us to see more
accurately the diversity as well as the commonalities present in the thought
and activity of particular prior time periods."'
Moreover, it can "help
us to appreciate more fully the extent and sources of both continuities and
discontinuities in antitrust experience over the course of the Sherman Act's
first century."55 To drive these points home, May reminds us of an
important insight derived from his own historical research:
For a great many Americans [in the years between the Civil War
and the First World War], antitrust law seemed the essential
logical complement to laissez-faire constitutionalism. While the
latter sought to protect the key rights of labor, property, and
exchange from the potential threats posed by the leading
governmental innovations of the era, the former sought to protect
these same core rights from the threats thought to be posed by the
most profoundly disturbing private innovations of the time.5
In The New Antitrust History, Daniel Ernst commends recent changes
in the writing of antitrust history.57 "Five years ago," Ernst writes, "the
antitrust lawyer looking for accounts of the formative era would be
unlikely to find one premised on discontinuity between the past and the
present."58 For Ernst, traditional lawyers' history is wrongheaded because
it presents history as continuous: "Driven by canons of common-law,
statutory, or constitutional reasoning, the professional paradigm assumes
that the legal past speaks authoritatively to the legal present."" Pointing
to the early work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. as the model for a more
austere view of history, Ernst writes that "Holmes saw history as a vehicle
for recognizing contingency in the legal system." 60 In contrast to Robert
53. Id at 863.
54. Id at 870.

55. Id
56. Id at 873.
57. See Ernst, supra note 35.

58. Id at 881.
59. Id at 879.
60. Id at 889 (discussing O.W. HOLMEs, The Path of the Law, in COLLr
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Bork's historical stuay in The Antitrust Paradox," which is "only the
most brazen and anachronistic resort to the authority of the past in a
contemporary debate over antitrust policy," 62 "the new antitrust historians
tried to learn from the [formative era] debate as a whole, and to take it on
its own terms, to ask why it ran the course it did, who pushed it along,
who opposed it, and what structures guided the participants' perceptions
of their needs and interests."'
Ernst praises the work of several "new historians," including Martin
Sklar, whose "great contribution... [is] his convincing specification of the
mediating structures or mechanism between social and cultural change and
developments in the law of antitrust."" "To date," Ernst continues,
"most antitrust historians have been content to point out simultaneous
developments in 'law' and distinct economic, social, and cultural spheres,
and to assert rather than demonstrate a causal connection between the
two."'
For Ernst, this approach is inadequate because it "gives the
impression that legal change is the result of an essentially consensual and
functional swapping of one paradigm for another, rather than the product
of human agency or a social movement. " ' Thus, human agency as the
mechanism of historical change is important for Ernst, who also believes
that the "corporate reconstruction of American capitalism was the conflictladen project of a group of self-conscious, struggling individuals who
shared a common social outlook-no less than the revolution in gender roles
in the 1960s was the project of the women's movement."'
IV. USING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO
FORMULATE THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Much like their counterparts in the preceding section, the four authors
that address the use of economic analysis to formulate the public interest
proceed from two levels. John Flynn has written a methodological and
ethical criticism of price-theory analysis and of several recent Supreme
Court decisions." David Levy, on the other hand, takes what initially
(1920)). Of course, Holmes also wrote that "a page of history is worth a volume
of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
61. R. BORK, supra note 31.
62. Ernst, supra note 35, at 882.
63. Id.at 883.
PAPERS

64. Id. at 888.
65. Id
66. Id

67. Id
68. See Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept of a'Competitive Process,35 N.Y.L.
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appears as a narrow focus--an economic analysis of submarkets in
retailing-to identify some profound limitations in the Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines and in the "New Learning" regarding market definition
more generally.' William Shepherd, as well as Walter Adams and James
Brock, presents criticisms coupled with alternative economic approaches,
approaches founded in the mainstream social-scientific practices of
empirical study.7"
In Antitrust Policy and the Concept of a Competitive Process, John
Flynn brings legal realism to bear on the formalist approaches of pricetheoretical work and of recent Supreme Court antitrust doctrine.71 Flynn
writes: "Paradoxically, one. must master concepts to understand and
organize reality, yet escape them at the same time in order to use concepts
functionally in the creative resolution of disputes."72 Price theorists are
imprisoned in the realm of theory because they identify "the public interest
in antitrust enforcement with the concept of 'competition,' the meaning of
which is too often confined to the definitions provided by a static and
abstract form of economic analysis." 73 Flynn recommends a two-step
escape. First, "it is essential to antitrust policy that the concept of
'competition' be understood as 'competition as a process' ... and that the
deeper normative meaning of the concept be properly understood and
inductively employed."74 Second, the process view of competition calls
for "rules designed to ensure the control of economic power that is
incompatible with the social and political values of a just community, the
integrity of individualism in that community, and the ideal of equality of
economic opportunity."' 5 Flynn concludes by calling for "creative and
constructive empirical social science research. This includes economic
6
research aware of its own assumptions ... .,,

In Economic Analysis to Guide Antitrust Enforcement: Prospectsfor
Section 2, William Shepherd reveals with shining clarity the differences
between mainstream and price-theoretical approaches to economics, in the

process identifying price theory's tight constraints, constraints which do not
reflect real market conditions.' Moreover, Shepherd asserts and then
SCH. L. REV.893 (1990).
69. See Levy, supra note 29.
70. See Adams & Brock, supra note 7; Shepherd, supra note 29.
71. See Flynn, supra note 68.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id at 393-94.
Id at 894.
Id at 896.
Id at 897.
Id at 910.
See Shepherd, supra note 29, at 925-27.

1990]

FOREWORD

documents the claims that "Chicago-UCLA and contestability theories
contain logical inconsistencies and lack a convincing empirical basis."".
He determines that the "issues remain largely as they stood before the
onset of Chicago-UCLA .... The profit yields of market share may reflect
market power and/or efficiency, in varying degrees. Only through careful,
direct research can we hope to determine the actual proportions.""'
Turning to the problem of market power, Shepherd offers a researched list
of possible candidates for treatment as dominant firms under a revitalized
section 2 of the Sherman Act. This list includes printed news media, an
industry in which
[t]he impact of monopoly on news content and the diversity of
views may far exceed the price-raising effects in, for example,
detergents and film. Yet policies have done nothing to reverse the
trend toward dominance in this industry. Rather, policies embody
an acceptance of the newspapers' claims that dominance reflects
technical economies of scale.... Yet the underlying 'economies'
may actually be much smaller .... .'
In short, Shepherd and Flynn both believe that helpful economics calls for
less abstraction and more empirical research.
In The Antitrust Vision and Its Revisionist Critics,Walter Adams and
James Brock begin by reminding us that "[tihe central challenge to a free
society is to construct an organizational framework-a governance
structure-to deal with both political and economic power."" "The
governance system imposed by the competitive market, of course, is
neither natural nor immutable. Like any human artifact, it must be nurtured
and protected from erosion and subversion. And that is the role of
antitrust."' The Chicago-School revision of this view, the authors say,
is "[f]abricated from tautological constructs . . . [and] begs the core
questions of economic power and antitrust. " 3 Adams and Brock look to
the American automobile industry as "an appropriate case study for
empirically testing the New Learning's claims."" They find that the
automobile industry wielded enough power to acquire and dismantle urban
transportation systems in several major cities (particularly Los Angeles),
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Md at 929-30.
I at 936.
Adams & Brock, supra note 7, at 939.
Id. at 941.
Id at 943.
Id at 946.
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to withhold fuel-efficient small cars for years, to deny consumers
automotive safety equipment until government regulation required the
equipment, and to lobby forcefully against automotive pollution control."
Also taking into account import restrictions and joint ventures to blunt
foreign competition, the authors'
empirical analysis highlights the central flaws of the New
Learing. It shows that market power includes the discretionary
power to control the choices from which consumers are permitted
to select, and the power to thereby control the allocation of
society's scarce resources in accordance with producers-rather
than consumers-preferences."6
Adams and Brock conclude with the following observation:
Massive empirical evidence indicates that a decentralized power
structure-the root principle of antitrust-does not have to be
sacrificed to attain either allocative efficiency, ... or a 'Paretooptimal' maximization of consumer welfare. If that be so, what
justification remains for the toleration of concentrated economic
power or for a policy of untrammeled laissez-faire which would
insulate such power from antitrust challenge?87
In Analyzing Anticompetitive Behavior in Retail Markets: Things Are
NotAlways As Simple As They May Appear, David Levy studies the effects
of market power in strictly local markets.88 Responding to the call for
more realism and less abstraction in antitrust economics, Levy writes: "In
real world situations, competition may occur along a number of different
dimensions, such as quality, physical space, or design. When the separate
firms compete along these different dimensions, then each potential source
of competition must be considered."89 One important implication of this
observation is that when
competition is localized, it may be relatively easier to detect and
punish cheaters and, therefore, substantial gains may accrue from
forming cartels with nearby firms.... When measured in terms
85. Id. at 946-60.
86. Id at 959.

87. Id at 967.
88. See Levy, supra note 29.
89. Id at 990. Levy also shows that the Merger Guidelines' definition of price can
yield perverse results, and then presents an alternative formulation that is both thoughtful
and straightforward. See id at 972-77.
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of all close competitors in a close chain of substitutes,
concentration may be a severely limited indicator of
anticompetitive behavior.... Collusion may occur among a subset
of firms. Even in the absence of collusion, merging firms may be
able to raise prices through joint action.' °
Levy further points out that "[wihen competition is localized, predatory
pricing may be more effectively targeted at rivals" and firms competing in
localized markets "may be more likely to deter entry than firms in markets
producing relatively homogeneous products."91 He concludes that
[a]nalysis of such a merger's anticompetitive impact should focus
principally on: (1) whether there are advantages to location, (2)
whether there are sunk-cost investments tied to the firm's location
such that entry and relocation are difficult, and (3) the magnitude
and extent of potential price effects under different behavioral
possibilities.'
The four articles engaging in antitrust economics are both striking and
refreshing in their dedication to empirical research and their conviction that
economic power remains an antitrust concern.
V. GOvRNMENT ACTION TO
REPRESENT THE PUBLIC INTEREST

While historians, economists, and legal scholars write about the public
interest, it is government action that ultimately represents it. The process
of representation is, of course, double. First, there is the familiar
institutional process of governmental politics: presidential and
congressional elections constitute the legitimate means of representation on
the federal level. Presidents make appointments to the Justice Department,
the Federal Trade Commission, and the federal bench, reflecting in some
perhaps pallid or distorted fashion an electoral mandate. Similarly,
Congress legislates. From this combination, government antitrust policy
emerges, representing something called the "public['s] interest." There is,
however, a second process of representation as well: an interpretive
mechanism that processes history, economics, and other cultural texts, a
mechanism that re-presents those texts in the form of antitrust policy and

90. Id. at 985. This observation leads to a very narrow view of the currently popular
notion of "contestability theory," particularly when read within the context of William
Shepherd's penetrating critique. See Shepherd, supra note 29, at 925-27.
91. Levy, supra note 29, at 988-89.
92. Id. at 990-91.
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doctrine. This process can be understood as one of interdisciplinary
translation-as a neutral policy analysis that assures good legal doctrine. It
can also be understood as an ethical operation-as a moral reasoning
process that assures good legal doctrine. Though separable for analytic
purposes, the doubled process of representing the public interest works in
tandem, each aspect both pulling and pushing the other.
Each article discussed in this section takes up one aspect of the twin
process of representing the public interest. William Curran understands
wealth-maximizing economics as a pernicious idealism that privileges the
private interests of a few over the public interest, as a representation whose
ethical vision is blind to the anti-democratic direction antitrust has
taken 3 In contrast, Robert Lande attends to the political-institutional
aspect of representing the public interest. 4 Finding the Bush
administration more amenable to antitrust enforcement and more willing
to cooperate with state antitrust officials, he develops a set of federalism
guidelines to enhance and clarify the cooperation already under way. Mark
Glick and Andrew Abere comment on recent antitrust policy by taking
issue with the way a recent book, Dangerous Pursuits,' interprets
empirical evidence to criticize the Reagan administration's laissez-faire
approach to the merger and acquisition frenzy of the 1980s.96 Walter
Adams and James Brock, the book's authors, respond in brief."
In After 100 Years: A DisquietingDiscourse of Poverty and Wealth,
William Curran writes that "the Supreme Court seems to equate democracy
with capitalism, and liberty and freedom with economic independence.""8
This confusion, or perhaps a cooption of the political sphere by the
economic, produces undesirable policy in both spheres. Taking a cue from
Kenneth Phillips' influential book, The Politics of Rich and Poor,"
Curran observes that "wealth has become antitrust's new reality and
guiding principle" and then asks why "[w]e fail to recognize poverty as the
sustenance of wealth.""° With the public interest imagined as free

93. See Curran, After 100 Years: A Disquieting Discourse of Poverty and Wealth, 35
N.Y.L. ScH. L.REV.1031 (1990).
94. See Lande, supra note 32.
95. W. ADAMS & . BROCK, DANGEROUS PURSUITS: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN
THE AGE OF WALL STREET (1989).
96. See Glick & Abere, Mergers and Acquisitions in the Age of Wall Street: An
Assessment, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.1095 (1990).
97. See Adams & Brock, Dangerous Pursuits v. Dr. Pangloss & Associates, 35 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REv. 1109 (1990).
98. Curran, supra note 93, at 1031 n.3.
99. K. PmLS, supra note 17.
100. Curran,supra note 93, at 1033, 1034.
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competition, "[t]he Court's narrow idealism... reduces democracy to the
free pursuit of efficiency."101 He concludes: "Democracy is far too
fragile to survive the Supreme Court's insensitive antitrust interpretations
based on its ahistorical1 belief
in wealth and efficiency as social guarantors
2
of universal welfare." 0
Robert Lande proposes a "series of merger 'Federalism Guidelines'"
whose "main purpose is to establish federalism principles in a way that
both federal and state enforcers, as well as the business community, would
regard as a step" toward "the correct balance of federal, state, and business
concerns." 0 3 When Should States 'Challenge Mergers: A Proposed
Federal/StateBalance begins by stating that, although the "antitrust laws'
legislative histories indicate the congressional purpose to supplement, not
supplant, state activity," 1" the proposed Guidelines would "start with the
premise of general federal supremacy in merger enforcement and from this
promulgate an explicit division of responsibility." 1" In response to fears
that "states could enact antimerger statutes with different substantive
goals" 6 or that the "state attorneys general often have parochial or
political motives,"" Lande points out that "the NAAG and DOJ
[merger] guidelines use virtually the same structural parameters and have
many other features in common."'0 8 Based in part on "the EEC Merger
Regulations that will go into effect in 1992," Lande's Federalism
Guidelines propose a category of large national mergers to be handled at
the federal level, a category of mergers that do not "disproportionately
affect a state," and a category of mergers that "primarily affect" only a
state. 0 State scrutiny would be limited to the third category. This
scheme would avoid the danger of Balkanization, Lande suggests, that the
European Community has averted with its 1992 guidelines. 1 0
Although the 1980s are only a few moments of history behind us,
much has already been written about the merger and acquisition rapture of
the last decade. In their review essay, entitled Mergers and Acquisitions in
the Age of Wall Street: An Assessment, Mark Glick and Andrew Abere
take issue with the characterization of the merger boom presented in
101. Id at 1040.
102. Id. at 1043.
103. Lande, supra note 32, at 1048, 1091.
104. Id at 1049.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id at 1048.
Id at 1066.
Id at 1065.
Id at 1060 n.50.
Id at 1082, 1086.
See /dat 1047-48.
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Dangerous Pursuits,"' a recent book written by Walter Adams and
James Brock.112 Adams and Brock criticize the laissez-faire program of
Reagan administration enforcers because, they believe, corporate takeovers
in the 1980s were a game that involved "an exchange of wealth,... 13a
trading of ownership titles instead of investment in the future."'
Adams and Brock associate mergers with the following economic
difficulties: loss of markets to foreign competition, &ersistenttrade deficits,
inadequate capital formation, lagging research and development, declining
productivity, and debt-laden balance sheets." 4 In addition to more
committed antitrust enforcement, they call for a broad range of
governmental action to regulate the takeover game: elimination of the
interest deduction for debt, tougher financial regulations on deal making,
a sales 11
tax5 on securities transfers, and the prevention of unproductive
mergers.
Glick and Abere offer an alternative view of the 1980s merger boom.
They argue that the Reagan administration's enforcement program is
underappreciated insofar as "many mergers were abandoned or restructured
by the parties following an enforcement authority request for additional
information, but before a court case or administrative complaint could be
filed." 1 16 Referring to several studies finding positive economic effects
of mergers in the 1980s, Glick and Abere conclude that "'[s]ome takeovers
enhance economic efficiency, some degrade it, and the 7balance of effects,
though not fully known, is most likely a close one.'"
In Dangerous Pursuits v. Dr.Pangloss& Associates,Adams and Brock
respond to Glick and Abere's review by presenting more evidence of the
merger boom's wake of debt-laden corporations at or over the brink of
bankruptcy, by surveying the opportunity costs of "a trillion dollars spent
on corporate deals,... a trillion dollars not directly spent on new plants,
new products, new production technologies, and new research and
development,"' and by renewing their call for merger guidelines that
require an affirmative showing that the deal is "likely to promote

111. W. ADAMS & . BROCK, supra note 95.
112. See Glick & Abere, supra note 96.
113. W. ADAMS & L BROCK, supra note 95, at 182. This theme has appeared in
numerous studies, including B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEmNDUSTRIALIZATION OF
AMERICA (1982); S. MELMAN, PRoFrrs WITHOUT PRODUCTION (1983).
114. W. ADAMS & J.BROCK, supra note 95, at 177-82.
115. Id
116. Glick & Abere, supra note 96, at 1097.

117. Id at 1104 (quoting Scherer, CorporateTakeovers: The Efficiency Arguments, 2
L ECON. PERsP. 69, 69 (1988)).
118. Adams & Brock, supra note 97, at 1112.
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production efficiency, innovation efficiency, and international
competitiveness." 9 In short, each pair of authors takes issue with the
other's representations of the public interests to be served, the effects of
the merger boom, and the effects of the Reagan administration's antitrust
enforcement in the 1980s.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Of the many questions raised in the symposium articles and at New
York Law School's antitrust centennial conference, three issues seem to
resonate, to reverberate throughout the papers and commentaries and
colloquy. Each issue raises important methodological and ethical questions
about the directions antitrust policy making and analysis should take.
First, the articles discussed in part IV of this foreword-those
discussing the use of economic analysis to formulate the public interest-all
have something to say about the importance of empirical research. Given
the spiraling abstraction of antitrust economics, this experimental turn is
a welcome change. What is interesting about this turn to the traditional
methodology of the sciences, both social and physical, is that it is
accompanied by a heightened awareness of the ethical implications of
current antitrust economics. This combination of empirical and ethical
dimensions is in sharp contrast to price theory, which typically ignores
both traditional kinds of economics: data gathering and analysis to test the
descriptive value of economic theories, and political economic analysis to
examine the prescriptive content of economic theories. The contributions
to this symposium serve as a powerful reminder of the value of mainstream
economic analysis and the huge gaps in price-theoretical work that
underlies much of current antitrust policy making.
Second, several conference sessions, especially the talk given by Lloyd
Constantine (who was then head of antitrust enforcement for the State of
New York), as well as the symposium contributions by Robert Lande and
David Levy, corroborate the importance of antitrust enforcement by the
several states, both individually and through the National Association of
Attorneys General. Not only local injuries caused by anti-competitive
conduct but also the local nature of competition in many industries
necessitate state enforcement of the public's interests. There is, of course,
a tradition
of state antitrust enforcement that precedes the Sherman
120
Act.
Third, the conference session on using historical analysis to formulate
the public interest concluded with a wide-ranging debate about the use and
abuse of history in antitrust and in law more generally. Provoked by Daniel

119. Id.at 1119.
120. See May, supra note 35, at 872-75.
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Ernst's "young Holmesian" view that "saw history as a vehicle for
recognizing contingency in the legal system,""' numerous participants
joined issue on the legitimate uses of history in lawyerly argument and
textual interpretation. In short, what can we claim to learn from the past?
Is law history, in the sense that the rule of law calls for adherence to the
past-to precedent and legislative intent? Or, is the past radically different
from the present? Is history properly imagined as discontinuous, and
accordingly, is the past abused when it is called upon as authority in
argument about the present?
Certainly, intense debates over the nature of historical change have
held center stage for well over a century. One axis of dispute has been the
question of (dis)continuity.
The continuity side is more familiar to lawyers and other
nonhistorians. Here are a few examples of "continuous" historiographies
founded in beliefs about the direction history has taken, about the progress
history has made in reaching some end or purpose. First, historian William
LaPiana points to one progressive view of history when he describes
Justice White's Victorian sense of the "[g]lorification of the common law
as the embodiment of English liberty." 1"
Next, otherwise opposed
economic historians can nonetheless agree that the engine of historical
change is both progressive and economic. Those, such as Robert Clark,
who argue that the common law (or other law) is efficient, write
progressive histories." Marxists also tend to write progressive
histories-reports of struggles between capital and labor, accounts of
accommodations to changing means of production and relations to those
means. The differences among these progressive historians are teleological;
the telos is Clark's transactional efficiency or White's English liberty or
Marx's triumph of the working class. The commonality is a belief that
history is a motivated unfurling of events. There are, of course, other
motivations that have been understood to drive history along some
continuous path.
The discontinuity side of the debate is more familiar to historians than
lawyers. There are, however, two well-known icons of discontinuity
revered by legal scholars. First, there is Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., whose
early writings have inspired many thoughtful historical studies, including
Daniel Ernst's contribution to this symposium. Second, the work of
philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn has influenced legal historians

121. Ernst, supra note 35, at 889.
122. LaPiana, supra note 34, at 839.
123. See, e.g., Clark, The InterdisciplinaryStudy of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE U.
1238, 1256-60 (1981) (suggesting a "seven-step method" for the construction and validation

of full, formal study and explanation of a line of legal evolution).
124. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCmNTiC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
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and other legal scholars for the last twenty years. Kuhn characterized
paradigm shifts in scientific communities as revolutions, as political events
precipitated by rhetorical struggles over the relative merits of competing
research programs in the various physical sciences. His purpose was to
argue against the then prevailing view of scientific advance, the view that
science evolved continuously. In contemporary cultural criticism and in
social science histories, many post-modernist and post-structuralist
historians take a Holmesian position of radical discontinuity, refusing
moreover to posit identifiable mechanisms for social change. 1"
How do we judge the relative merits of various historiographies? How
do we choose a particular approach? In writing history, we may not think
about it at all; perhaps we proceed on unexamined assumptions about the
way history "unfurls." We experience the process of writing history as
first immersing ourselves in the facts and finally emerging with a sense of
how they fit together. If we do think about the relative merits of various
approaches, then the choice is poetic: we examine alternative assumptions
and then make a complex series of judgments about the relationship
between the present and the past, judgments that cannot be proved in some
logical or otherwise final sense. Though poetic judgments cannot be
verified in some rigorous sense, they can be the result of defensible and
criticizable reasoning.
In my view, the criterion for judging the relative merits of alternative
approaches is whether a particular one illuminates the legal-historical field
that needs to be considered today. Given the anti-empirical and ahistorical
form of economics dominating antitrust today, historical analysis of the
relationship between antitrust and economics is called for. The approach
that I have chosen for my historical work is genealogical-an approach
which has been described as "a painstaking rediscovery of struggles
together with the rude memory of their conflicts."126 With the notion of
difference as the guiding thread (rather than one pole of a continuitydiscontinuity reduction), this history of the present can be understood as
a two-step process: we begin at the present and move backward in time
until we locate a difference. Then, we work forward, tracing the
transformation, taking care to preserve both discontinuities and connections
in the historical line. 27 A genealogy is, in my view, preferable because

125. The two are not logically related. Ernst, for example, understands history as
discontinuous, yet praises Sklar for explaining the mechanism of historical change
chronicled in his article. See Ernst, supra note 35, at 889. The mechanism is characterized
as social movements and individual struggles for change. See Sklar, supra note 34, at 826.
126. M. FOUCAULT, TWo Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLMGE 83 (1980).
127. See F. NmITzScHm, THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY (A. Collins trans. 2d ed.

1957).
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it "allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles," 128 to see

current antitrust economics as the product of social and political conflict,
and finally, to understand that efficiency is a controversial social and
political choice, not a scientific or logical necessity.

128. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 126, at 83.

